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“Justice, justice shalt thou pursue, . . .” 1
I. ASSESSING THE COMPETENCE OF COUNSEL IN RIGHT TO
REFUSE TREATMENT CASES
If Michael Perlin spoke in a forest, and no one heard him speak, would
he still make a sound? That is the question I ask you to consider as I
respond to Michael’s article. 2
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law; Clinical Professor,
Department of Psychiatry, School of Medicine, University of California, San Diego;
Chairperson, Atascadero State Hospital Advisory Board. I wish to express my sincere
appreciation to the University of San Diego for the financial support it provided for this
project.
1. “. . . that thou mayest live, and inherit the land which the LORD thy God giveth
thee.” 16 Deuteronomy 20.
2. Michael L. Perlin, “And My Best Friend, My Doctor / Won’t Even Say What It
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Lawyers who represent mentally disabled clients in civil commitment
cases and in right to refuse treatment cases, Michael tells us, are guilty of
several crimes. They are inadequate. They are inept. They are ineffective.
They are invisible. They are incompetent. And worst of all, they are
indifferent. Is Michael right in his accusations? You bet he is!
The very ethics of our profession require lawyers to represent their
clients competently3 and to act as zealous advocates for their clients,4
“pursu[ing] their clients’ objectives single-mindedly, without regard to
the interests of others.”5 Let me just discuss one example to demonstrate
that lawyers representing the mentally disabled do not act competently
and as zealous advocates. In 1966, a California legislative subcommittee
issued a report that questioned the legal, moral, and practical worth of
California’s civil commitment laws and recommended fundamental
changes in the commitment system.6 In response, the California Legislature
enacted the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, known as LPS, which embodied
the subcommittee’s recommendations.7 LPS has been hailed as “the Magna
Carta of the mentally ill.”8 LPS has served as a model of progressive
Is I’ve Got”: The Role and Significance of Counsel in Right to Refuse Treatment Cases,
42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735 (2005). Michael’s article, and my response to it, are based on
presentations made at the Conference on Capacity to Consent to Treatment and/or
Research: Legal and Psychiatric Dimensions, conducted at the Southern California Law
Center, April 17, 2004.
3. “A lawyer should represent a client competently.” MODEL CODE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY Canon 6 (1980).
4. “A lawyer should represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law.”
Id. Canon 7; see id. EC 7-19; ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (5th
ed. 2003) (“A lawyer’s responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer of the
legal system and a public citizen are usually harmonious. Thus, when an opposing party
is well represented, a lawyer can be a zealous advocate on behalf of a client and at the
same time assume that justice is being done.”).
5. Catherine J. Lanctot, The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics of the
Federal Government Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 951,
959–60 (1991).
6. SUBCOMM. ON MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES, ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMM. ON
WAYS AND MEANS, CAL. LEGIS., THE DILEMMA OF MENTAL COMMITMENTS IN
CALIFORNIA—A BACKGROUND DOCUMENT (1966).
7. Division 5 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code, entitled Community
Mental Health Services, was added by the California Mental Health Act of 1967. 1967
Cal. Stat., ch. 1667, § 36. Division 5 consists of two parts: the Lanterman-Petris-Short
Act, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5000–5550 (West 1998 & Supp. 2005), and the
Bronzan-McCorquodale Act (formerly the Short-Doyle Act), id. §§ 5600–5755.1. The
Bronzan-McCorquodale Act provides the legislative framework for the organizing and
financing of “community mental health services for the mentally disordered in every
county through locally administered and locally controlled community mental health
programs.” Id. § 5600 (West 1998).
8. The statement is attributed to Maurice Rodgers, spokesperson for the
California State Psychological Association. EUGENE BARDACH, THE SKILL FACTOR IN
POLITICS: REPEALING THE MENTAL COMMITMENT LAWS IN CALIFORNIA 126 (1972).
Other writers also state that LPS has been described as the Magna Carta of the mentally
ill, but they do not reveal the source of the statement. See, e.g., Hearings on the
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legislation, has been commended by writers9 and judges,10 and copied by
other state legislatures.11 With only some minor tinkering over the
years, LPS remains the law today in California.
A key component of LPS is the elimination of indeterminate commitment
of nondangerous, mentally ill persons and the creation of a conservatorship
process designed to provide continuing assistance to gravely disabled
patients who need such assistance after they have been treated in a mental
hospital for seventeen days or less. For an LPS conservator to be
appointed, the court must find that the patient is gravely disabled—defined
as “[a] condition in which [the] person, as a result of mental disorder, is
unable to provide for his or her basic personal needs for food, clothing,
or shelter.”12 The LPS conservatorship is established for a one-year
period, but it may be renewed upon proof of continuing grave disability.
Eight years after LPS was enacted into law, I asked students in my
seminar in Law and Mental Disorder to observe the LPS conservatorship
proceedings in the San Diego County Superior Court and gather data on
the performance of attorneys representing individuals for whom a
conservatorship was proposed.13 The students observed sixty-three court
hearings,14 and here is what they reported. Eight hearings were one
minute or less in duration. Nineteen hearings were between one and two
minutes in duration. Nine hearings were between two and three minutes
in duration. Thus, more than half the hearings—a total of thirty-six of
the sixty-three that were observed—were completed in three minutes or

Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 316 (1970) (statement of Dr. Roger
Egeberg, Assistant Secretary for Health and Scientific Affairs, Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare); Marc F. Abramson, The Criminalization of Mentally
Disordered Behavior: Possible Side-Effect of a New Mental Health Law, 23 HOSP. &
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 101, 105 (1972).
9. See, e.g., FRANK W. MILLER ET AL., THE MENTAL HEALTH PROCESS xvi (2d ed.
1976) (characterizing the California experiment as “innovative” and declaring that LPS
“must be considered throughout any discussion of mental health programs”).
10. See, e.g., David L. Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L.
REV. 742, 753 (1969) ( “[LPS] promises virtually to eliminate involuntary hospitalization
except for short-term crisis situations. . . . The procedural protections it promises are
impressive indeed when compared with commitment proceedings in other states”).
11. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.05.010–.940 (West 2002 & Supp.
2005).
12. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5008(h)(1)(A) (West 1998).
13. See Grant H. Morris, Conservatorship for the “Gravely Disabled”: California’s
Nondeclaration of Nonindependence, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 201, 225 (1978).
14. See id. at 232.
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less.15 Ironically, the LPS conservatorship hearings were of a shorter
average duration than the 4.7 minute average of pre-LPS civil commitment
hearings.16
In forty-two of the sixty-three cases, counsel representing a proposed
conservatee asked no questions of the reporting psychiatrist. In most of
the remaining twenty-one cases, the lawyer asked only one question. In
only one case did the proposed conservatee’s counsel request either the
assistance of a psychiatrist or the examination of the proposed conservatee
by another psychiatrist. There was not a single case in which counsel for
the proposed conservatee offered testimony of an independent psychiatrist.
In fifty-six of the sixty-three cases, no questions were asked of the
proposed conservatee. In fifty-eight of the sixty-three cases, counsel for
the proposed conservatee neither proposed alternatives to conservatorship
nor even suggested that others explore these possibilities. In only one case
did a lawyer urge that the proposed conservatee be permitted to retain
his driver’s license, and in no case did a lawyer resist the imposition of
contractual disability—the right to enter into contracts—on his or her
client.17
Clearly, the conservatorship hearings observed by my students were
meaningless formalities, show trials, “an empty shell” to borrow words
from Michael Perlin and Deborah Dorfman, “offering only an illusion of
due process.”18 Rolling over and playing dead is not competent
representation. Rolling over and playing dead is not zealous advocacy
on behalf of one’s client.
Perhaps, it could be argued, such attorney inaction at the conservatorship
hearing was appropriate. Perhaps the attorney made a reasoned decision
not to contest the establishment of a conservatorship because the
evidence of grave disability was so overwhelming that resistance was
both futile and unwarranted. But not so. Attorney nonperformance at
trial was a direct result of the failure of attorneys to investigate the facts
and to fully prepare their clients’ cases. For the small fee that the county
paid them,19 most attorneys made one visit to the client in the facility
15. Id. at 232. Only nine hearings were more than eight minutes in duration. Id. at
232 n.173.
16. Id. at 232.
17. Id. at 233.
18. Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, Is It More Than “Dodging Lions
and Wastin’ Time”? Adequacy of Counsel, Questions of Competence, and the Judicial
Process in Individual Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 2 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L.
114, 130 (1996).
19. At the time of the study, private attorneys were paid only $75 for each case in
which they served as appointed counsel for a proposed conservatee in a conservatorship
hearing. Morris, supra note 13, at 234. Today, indigent proposed conservatees are
represented by attorneys from the Office of the Public Defender which contracts with the
county to provide such representation.
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where he or she was detained, ensured that the papers in the case were in
order, and made an appearance at the conservatorship hearing. Some
attorneys did even less. Several were observed meeting their clients for
the first time at the hearing itself. Appointed counsel almost never
attended the psychiatric evaluation of their client that was performed a
few days prior to the hearing, although they were welcome to do so.
Most attorneys did not even examine the psychiatric report prior to the
hearing, even though the report was almost always entered into evidence
upon stipulation and was often the most significant evidence in the case
supporting the appointment of a conservator. Some attorneys expressed
concern that if they “make waves” at the hearing, they could jeopardize
their chances of being appointed to represent proposed conservatees in
future cases.
Nevertheless, one might assert, proof of inadequate performance by
attorneys in conservatorship cases tells us nothing about the performance
of attorneys in civil commitment cases and in right to refuse treatment
cases. But not so. It tells us everything. If an LPS conservatorship is
established, the court may grant the conservator the authority to place his
or her conservatee in a mental hospital20 and to require the conservatee
to receive treatment to remedy or prevent the recurrence of the conservatee’s
condition of grave disability.21
The statutes in California provide that a person may apply for
voluntary admission to a mental treatment facility when he or she is
mentally competent to apply, or, if he or she is an LPS conservatee,
when his or her conservator applies if the court has granted the
conservator the authority to place the conservatee in a mental treatment
facility.22 However much the conservatee protests, he or she is admitted
to that facility as a voluntary patient. Although other voluntary patients
may depart the facility by giving notice of a desire to do so, LPS
conservatees may depart only if notice is given by their conservators.23
However much the conservatee protests, he or she may be required to
take psychotropic medication that his or her doctor prescribes and the
conservator, exercising a substituted judgment for the conservatee,
authorizes.24 Although the court, in appointing a conservator for a
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5358(a)(2) (West 1998).
Id. § 5358(b).
Id. §§ 6000(a) & 6002.
Id. § 6002.
A California statute specifically declares that involuntarily detained mental
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gravely disabled person, has discretion to grant or to withhold the
placement authority, the court almost always grants that authority to the
conservator. The court granted the conservator this placement power in
each and every one of the sixty-three cases that my students observed.25
Elsewhere, I characterize these conservatorship statutes as “California’s
nondeclaration of nonindependence,”26 laws that allow civil commitment
and coerced treatment without the crunch.27 For LPS conservatees, there
is no involuntary civil commitment hearing. For LPS conservatees,
there is no right to refuse treatment hearing. California’s so-called
“Magna Carta of the mentally ill” allows carte blanche control over the
mentally ill, and attorneys representing mentally ill clients play their
role—or should I say, their roll over—in assuring that result. In only
two of the sixty-three cases that my students observed, did the proposed
conservatee’s lawyer even question whether the conservator should be
empowered to involuntarily confine his or her client as a voluntary
patient and to require the client to submit to the administration of
psychotropic medication. Who argued, on behalf of his or her client,
that an inability to provide for food, clothing, and shelter—the criteria
necessary to establish a conservatorship—does not necessarily equate to
an inability to understand the risks, benefits, and alternatives to
psychotropic medication? Who demanded, on behalf of his or her client,
that the court make a separate finding of fact that the proposed
conservatee lacked the capacity to understand the risks, benefits, and
alternatives to psychotropic medication—the criteria necessary to give or
withhold informed consent—before it granted the conservator the
authority to order that such treatment be imposed over the conservatee’s
objection? There were no such arguments; there were no such demands.
II. WHY ARE PATIENTS’ COUNSEL INCOMPETENT?
Michael provides us with the reason for this sorry state of affairs:
sanism. Sanism is a word that Michael did not create,28 but one that he
patients “have the right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic medication . . . .” Id. §
5325.2. When an involuntary patient objects to treatment, treatment may be
administered only if he or she is determined to lack the capacity to refuse treatment at a
hearing held to determine his or her capacity. Id. § 5332(b) (West Supp. 2005). Other
legislation specifically details the procedures for conducting capacity hearings. Id. §
5333–5334 (West 1998). However, the California Legislature has not enacted legislation
to provide a right to refuse treatment for voluntary mental patients, whether they were
admitted to a mental treatment facility based on their own decision or whether they were
admitted to such a facility by the decision of their conservator.
25. Morris, supra note 13, at 228.
26. See id. at 201.
27. Id. at 215.
28. Morton Birnbaum is generally credited with coining the word “sanism.” See Morton
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has certainly popularized in various contexts in numerous writings and
speeches.29 Sanism, he tells us, is irrational prejudice against the mentally
disabled. It is, as Michael has described it, “The Hidden Prejudice.”30
Sanism is just like any other prejudice. We are prejudiced against some
people because we do not like the way they look, the way they think, or
the way they act. They are different from us, and we know we are
superior to them in looks, in thought, or in the way we act. We are right,
and they are wrong. We know that we are better than they are; therefore,
they must be inferior.
Africans were never treated as equals. Their religion, their culture,
their civilization was deemed primitive. And so, as superior beings from
an advanced society, we enslaved them—a whole race of people—so
that their cheap labor could enable our cotton to be picked.31 When
slavery ended, we mandated that African Americans be kept separate
and unequal. We could not risk that they commingle with those of us
who were superior beings. Did you think that only the Nazis were
concerned about the need to maintain the purity of the Aryan race?
Women were the weaker sex. Surely they were not fit to vote or work.
Everyone knew that women’s place was in the home. Their role was
limited to cooking, cleaning, childbearing, and child rearing. After all,
they promised to love, honor, and especially to obey their superior male
counterparts.
Gay people engage in conduct that we view as not merely unacceptable
Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment: Some Comments on Its Development, in MEDICAL,
MORAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH CARE 97, 106–07 (Frank J. Ayd, Jr. ed., 1974).
29. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, “You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks”:
Sanism in Clinical Teaching, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 683, 683–729 (2003) (discussing the
meaning of sanism, sanist courts and lawyers, sanism and clinical teaching, and sanism
and clinical law students); Michael L. Perlin, “For the Misdemeanor Outlaw”: The
Impact of the ADA on the Institutionalization of Criminal Defendants with Mental
Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV. 193, 234–36 (2000) (discussing sanism as applied to
criminal defendants who claim to be mentally incompetent to stand trial or who plead
insanity as a defense to a crime); MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL
DISABILITY ON TRIAL 21–58 (2000) (discussing the concept of sanism, the roots of
sanism, and sanist attitudes of the public and the legal system toward mentally disabled
persons). This book also discusses sanism in specific contexts, such as involuntary civil
commitment law, id. at 92–98, the right to sexual interaction, id. at 167–69, the
Americans with Disabilities Act, id. at 200–03, competence to plead guilty and to waive
counsel, id. at 218–19, and the insanity defense, id. at 237–38.
30. In fact, Michael entitled his book on sanism “The Hidden Prejudice.” PERLIN,
supra note 29.
31. “Hollow man lookin’ in a cotton field / For dignity.” BOB DYLAN, Dignity, on
BOB DYLAN’S GREATEST HITS, VOL. 3 (1994).
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but as perverted. Not that long ago, homosexuality was characterized as
a mental disorder. If unchallenged, the gay lifestyle threatens the very
core of our religious beliefs. And so we love the sinner, but hate the sin.
Unfortunately, most of us tend to equate the perceived sinner with the
perceived sin.
We hate Jews because they deny the deity of Christ. It seems like
only yesterday that Jews were portrayed as Christ killers. As a matter of
fact, it was only yesterday—in the most popular movie of 2004.32
Surely the mentally ill are appropriate targets for our prejudice. After all,
they are mentally “ill,” and we are mentally healthy. They are mentally
“disabled,” and we are mentally able. They are mentally “disordered”—their
thinking is irrational—and our thinking is always well-ordered and rational.
They must be inferior beings. We know their disordered thinking makes
them dangerous. Don’t try to confuse us with recent studies confirming
that psychotic symptoms, such as delusions or hallucinations, currently
being experienced by a person, do not elevate his or her risk of
violence.33 We know better. Every day, or so it seems, we read about
some crazy person committing a horrible crime and avoiding punishment
by hiring a clever lawyer who uses a dishonest psychiatrist to successfully
hoodwink the jury into finding the defendant not guilty by reason of
insanity.
And even those mentally disabled people who aren’t dangerous, they
need to take their medicine so they don’t walk around the streets
32. The movie is The Passion of the Christ, whose gross box office receipts were
over $145 million in its first week of distribution in the United States and over $354
million in the six and one-half week period between Ash Wednesday, when it opened,
and Easter Sunday. David Germain, ‘Passion’ Returns to Top Spot Over Easter
Weekend, TRIBUNE (San Luis Obispo, CA), Apr. 12, 2004, at B5. This box office total
more than doubles the $160 million reportedly raised by President George W. Bush in
several months of fund-raising to support his campaign for re-election. See Mark 12:17:
“And Jesus answering said unto them, ‘Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s;
and to God the things that are God’s.’ And they marvelled at him.” See also Matthew
22:21–22.
33. MACARTHUR RESEARCH NETWORK ON MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAW,
MACARTHUR VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY, Executive Summary (April 2001 &
May 2004 update), at http://macarthur.virginia.edu/risk.html (last updated Apr., 2001);
see also Henry J. Steadman et al., Violence by People Discharged From Acute
Psychiatric Inpatient Facilities and by Others in the Same Neighborhoods, 55 ARCHIVES
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 393, 400 (1998) (reporting that the MacArthur Violence Risk
Assessment Study found that the prevalence of violence among ex-mental patients
without symptoms of substance abuse and others living in the same neighborhoods
without symptoms of substance abuse was statistically indistinguishable); Bruce G. Link
et al., The Violent and Illegal Behavior of Mental Patients Reconsidered, 57 AM. SOC.
REV. 275, 290 (1992) (finding that the risk of violence from mentally disabled people—even
people who are currently experiencing psychotic symptoms—is “comparable to the risks
associated with common social statuses [e.g., male gender, young age, limited education]
and a trivial contribution to the overall level of violent/illegal behavior in American
society”).
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annoying us by their panhandling and their strange talk. Why don’t they
just get jobs and live a normal life? Don’t try to confuse us with recent
studies linking an increased risk of diabetes, obesity, and heart disease to
the use of Clozaril, Risperdal, Zyprexa, and other antipsychotic medications,34
or that link an increased risk of suicide to the use of Paxil, Prozac,
Zoloft, and other antidepressant SSRIs.35 We know that these medications
are powerful, mind-altering drugs, but these people are crazy, and they
need these drugs to make them sane. These drugs are all FDA-approved,
and we trust their doctors to weigh the risks and benefits and to prescribe
them only when appropriate for use by their patients.
Although our society is far from perfect, at least we have made some
progress in combating, though not eradicating, discrimination. “The times
they are a-changin’.”36 (It would not be possible to pay tribute to Michael
Perlin without at least some mention of the lyrics of Bob Dylan.)37
Today, African American children attend, and are even welcomed, at
schools and universities throughout America, and Rosa Parks no longer
sits in the back of the Birmingham bus. Today, when women graduate
college—and they graduate in numbers that equal, if not surpass, their
male counterparts—and find employment, they are no longer automatically
relegated to the secretarial pool. Just last year, all across this country—from
San Francisco in the west to New Paltz in the east—more than 4000 gay
couples exchanged vows of marriage. And no, San Francisco, that
Sodom of the West, and New Paltz, that Gomorrah of the East, have
34. See Consensus Development Conference on Antipsychotic Drugs and Obesity
and Diabetes, 27 DIABETES CARE 596, 597 (2004). Participants in the conference
included the American Diabetes Association, the American Psychiatric Association, the
North American Association for the Study of Obesity, and the American Association of
Clinical Endocrinologists.
35. Gardiner Harris, FDA: Antidepressants Can Lead to Suicide, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Mar. 23, 2004, at A1; New Warning Urged About Depression Medication,
TRIBUNE (San Luis Obispo, CA), Mar. 23, 2004, at A3.
36. BOB DYLAN, The Times They Are A-Changin’, on THE TIMES THEY ARE
A-CHANGIN’ (1964).
37. For those readers who may be unaware of Michael’s attraction to the words of
Bob Dylan, let me merely note that beginning in 1996 (with three articles in that year
alone), the prolific Michael Perlin has consistently used Bob Dylan song titles or lyrics
in the titles of the numerous law review articles he has written. In the text of his articles,
Michael always explains the applicability of Dylan’s words to the subject upon which
Michael is writing. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, “The Executioner’s Face is Always
Well-Hidden”: The Role of Counsel and the Courts in Determining Who Dies, 41 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 201 (1996); Michael L. Perlin, “I’ll Give You Shelter From the Storm”:
Privilege, Confidentiality, and Confessions of Crime, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1699 (1996);
Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 18, at 114.
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not yet been destroyed by fire and brimstone,38 or even by a simple
earthquake.39
But progress in combating discrimination against the mentally disabled?
“Th[at] groom’s still waiting at the altar.”40 Why do lawyers advocate
zealously for criminal defendants charged with child molestation or
serial murder, but not for a mentally disabled person who faces
involuntary confinement when he or she has committed no crime? Why
do lawyers advocate zealously for Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols,
or for John Allen Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo, but not for a
mentally disabled person who merely wishes to exercise the right to
refuse psychotropic medication?
Lawyers who represent the mentally disabled in civil commitment
proceedings do not believe that they are prejudiced against their clients.
In fact, the possibility that their sanist beliefs may cause them to roll
over and play dead in civil commitment proceedings does not even enter
their conscious thought. Our society, and I include lawyers and judges
as members of our society, characterizes mental disorder through a
medical model. Mentally “ill” people are sick, and because they are “out
of their minds,” they do not realize that they need medicine to make
them well, so that they will again be “in their right minds.” And who
can tell us whether a person is mentally ill and needs to be hospitalized
for inpatient treatment? Obviously, doctors are the experts on diagnosing
illness, not lawyers or judges.
Even though the Supreme Court has acknowledged that involuntary
hospitalization, especially when accompanied by coerced treatment, is “a
massive curtailment of liberty,”41 somehow we don’t view an adversarial
proceeding as appropriate when the curtailment of liberty is not for the
purpose of punishing a criminal, but rather, for the purpose of treating a
person’s mental illness in order to make him or her well. And so we defer
to the doctors. Tell us doctor, is the proposed patient suffering from a mental
illness? Tell us doctor, is the proposed patient’s mental illness sufficiently
severe that the person satisfies our vaguely worded commitment statute
requiring danger to self or others or inability to provide for one’s basic
necessities? Did the doctor answer “yes” to both questions? Case closed.
38. 19 Genesis 24: “Then the LORD rained upon Sodom and upon Gomorrah
brimstone and fire from the LORD out of heaven . . . .”
39. It should be noted, however, that six months after same-sex marriages began
being performed in San Francisco, the California Supreme Court ruled that city and
county officials lacked authority to issue marriage licenses to, solemnize marriages of,
and register certificates of marriage for same-sex couples; and that marriages conducted
between same-sex couples in violation of the applicable statutes were void and of no
legal effect. Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459, 499 (Cal. 2004).
40. BOB DYLAN, The Groom’s Still Waiting at the Altar, on SHOT OF LOVE (1981).
41. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
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Although many articles have been written about the inadequacy of
counsel in civil commitment proceedings,42 surprisingly, as Michael
mentions in his article,43 almost nothing has been written about the
inadequacy of counsel in right to refuse medication hearings—a striking,
near-total lack of attention.44 I am not surprised. Here again, the medical
model is used, this time to determine what medication is appropriate to
treat the person’s mental illness. Who can tell us what medication is
appropriate to treat our involuntarily confined mental patient? Obviously,
doctors are the experts in prescribing medication, not lawyers or judges.
Even though the Supreme Court has acknowledged that a mentally ill
person—in fact, even a mentally ill, sentence-serving prisoner—“possesses
a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of
42. In 1966, Fred Cohen wrote an article describing the lawyer who represents a
proposed patient in a typical civil commitment hearing as “a stranger in a strange land
without benefit of guidebook, map, or dictionary.” Fred Cohen, The Function of the
Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44 TEX. L. REV. 424, 424 (1966). Over
the years, several articles have echoed a similar theme—that the lawyer representing a
mentally disordered client is uncertain whether to choose a “best interest” role model
(that is, the lawyer should determine the client’s best interests and pursue those interests
in the civil commitment or other hearing involving the client) or the traditional,
adversarial model (that is, the client should make the ultimate decisions on all matters
and the lawyer should advocate the position expressly favored by his or her client). Most
of these articles have discussed the role of counsel in civil commitment proceedings.
See, e.g., Michael Blinick, Mental Disability, Legal Ethics, and Professional Responsibility,
33 ALB. L. REV. 92 (1968); Elliott Andalman & David L. Chambers, Effective Counsel
for Persons Facing Civil Commitment: A Survey, a Polemic, and a Proposal, 45 MISS.
L.J. 43 (1974); Thomas R. Litwack, The Role of Counsel in Civil Commitment
Proceedings: Emerging Problems, 62 CAL. L. REV. 816 (1974); Note, The Role of
Counsel in the Civil Commitment Process: A Theoretical Framework, 84 YALE L.J. 1540
(1975); Michael L. Perlin & Robert L. Sadoff, Ethical Issues in the Representation of
Individuals in the Commitment Process, 45 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161 (Summer
1982); Virginia Aldigé Hiday, The Attorney’s Role in Involuntary Civil Commitment, 60
N.C. L. REV. 1027 (1982); Michael L. Perlin, Fatal Assumption: A Critical Evaluation of
the Role of Counsel in Mental Disability Cases, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 39 (1992);
Donald H. Stone, Giving a Voice to the Silent Mentally Ill Client: An Empirical Study of
the Role of Counsel in the Civil Commitment Hearing, 70 UMKC L. REV. 603 (2002).
Most of these articles contain or cite data demonstrating that legal representation of the
mentally disordered client in the civil commitment context is inadequate and assert that
lawyers should apply the traditional adversarial model in representing their mentally
disordered clients.
43. Perlin, supra note 2, at 743.
44. Among the few articles written on the subject are: Michael L. Perlin,
“Salvation” or a “Lethal Dose”? Attitudes and Advocacy in Right to Refuse Treatment
Cases, 4 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAC. No. 4, at 51 (2004); Perlin & Dorfman, supra note
18, at 114; Melvin R. Shaw, Professional Responsibility of Attorneys Representing
Institutionalized Mental Patients in Relation to Psychotropic Medication, 22 J. HEALTH
& HOSP. L. 186 (1989).
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antipsychotic drugs,”45 again, we do not consider an adversarial proceeding
to be appropriate when the curtailment of that liberty interest is not for
the purpose of punishing a criminal, but rather, for the purpose of
treating the person’s mental illness in order to make him or her well.
And so we defer to the doctors. Tell us doctor, is the medication that
you are prescribing for this patient medically appropriate for the
patient’s condition despite any potential side effects that the patient may
experience? Would a rational person take that medication despite those
potential side effects? Did the doctor answer “yes” to both questions?
Case closed.
But deference to doctors is not the only reason that the right to refuse
treatment is not taken seriously. In addition to a medical judgment that
the proposed treatment is appropriate, there has also been a legal judgment
that this person’s mental illness is sufficiently serious to warrant his or
her placement in a mental hospital for treatment. In essence, the civil
commitment decision gives a legal imprimatur—a seal of approval—to
the person’s status as less than a full-fledged human being. We don’t
need to listen to this person’s objections to treatment—no matter how
rational those objections are—because we believe that the civil commitment
decision “proved” that his or her ideas, concerns, and worries are not
worthy of our consideration.
Despite numerous appellate court decisions holding that a person’s
incompetence to make treatment refusal decisions is not established by a
decision to involuntarily civil commit that person and that a separate
hearing on that issue is required,46 we do not accept the separate hearing
45. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990). The Supreme Court
specifically identified the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as the
source of that liberty interest. Id. at 221–22; see also Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127,
135 (1992) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the forcing of
antipsychotic medication on criminal defendants held for trial “absent a finding of
overriding justification and a determination of medical appropriateness”); Sell v. United
States, 539 U.S. 166, 178–83 (2003) (discussing and relying upon Harper and Riggins as
setting the framework for determining whether and under what circumstances the
government may forcibly administer antipsychotic medication to render a criminal
defendant competent to stand trial). See Grant H. Morris, Mental Disorder and the
Civil/Criminal Distinction, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1177, 1197–1207 (2004), for a critique
of the Sell decision.
46. See, e.g., Riese v. St. Mary’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 271 Cal. Rptr. 199, 201, 210
(Ct. App. 1987) (holding that in nonemergency situations, antipsychotic medication
cannot be administered to involuntarily committed civil patients without their consent
absent a judicial determination of their incapacity to make treatment decisions); Rogers
v. Comm’r of the Dep’t of Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d 308, 314 (Mass. 1983) (holding
that involuntarily committed civil patients do not lose the right to make treatment
decisions unless they are adjudicated incompetent by a judge in incompetency
proceedings); Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 342–44 (N.Y. 1986) (holding that
involuntary civil commitment, without more, does not establish that the committed
person lacks the mental capacity to comprehend the consequences of medication refusal
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requirement as anything but a meaningless and unnecessary, formalistic
impediment to treatment. If mental illness alone does not equate with
incompetence, then surely a decision to civilly commit the mentally ill
person must equate. After all, the court has ordered this person placed in
a mental hospital, and hospitals are for treatment. We can’t allow this
sick patient to transform the hospital into a prison, remaining there
untreated for an indefinite period of time. Obviously, we conclude, the
doctor’s medical judgment on what treatment should be administered
should trump the involuntary mental patient’s claim of a legal right to
refuse treatment.
III. WILL COMPETENT COUNSEL BE AN ADEQUATE REMEDY?
To change this purely theoretical right—this “paper” right, as Michael
characterizes it,47 into a right with a real remedy, Michael recommends
that organized and regularized counsel be appointed—lawyers who are
specifically trained to represent individual mental patients who assert a
right to refuse treatment.48 “[T]he presence of adequate counsel,” he
informs us, “is of critical importance in the disposition of right to refuse
treatment cases.”49 Just as with civil commitment cases, the quality of
counsel is also “the single most important factor”50 in the decisions that
are reached in treatment refusal cases. A mentally disabled person will
be fully valued as a member of our society only if a competent lawyer
vigorously advocates for him or her in any legal proceeding in which
that person is involved.
Is Michael right? Yes, of course he is. However, I qualify my affirmative
response with a large asterisk. What if Michael rallies lawyers to his
cause? What if they do start advocating aggressively for the mentally
disabled? What if they demonstrate that some mentally disabled patients
are competent to give or withhold their consent to psychotropic medication?
What if courts follow the lead of the Montana Supreme Court in its
decisions and that a judicial determination that the patient lacks that capacity is required
before the state may administer antipsychotic drugs over the patient’s objection).
Utilizing the informed consent doctrine, “virtually every court that has considered the
matter now recognizes a ‘right to refuse’ psychotropic medication for institutionalized
populations.” RALPH REISNER ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL ASPECTS 923 (4th ed. 2004).
47. Perlin, supra note 2, at 736–37.
48. Id. at 748.
49. Id. at 746.
50. Id. (quoting Perlin, supra note 2, at 49).
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landmark K.G.F.51 decision—a decision that requires counsel for the
mentally disabled be competent and that imposes specific performance
standards on them to assure that they are competent—although, as
Michael tells us, not a single court in any of the other forty-nine states
has yet done so since that case was decided?52 Surely, if this happens,
mental patients who assert a right to refuse treatment will be more
successful in the court proceedings in which their competency to decide
is in issue.
Michael will have succeeded, but will he be satisfied by the success he
has achieved? In the words of Lady Macbeth, “Nought’s had, all’s
spent, / Where our desire is got without content.”53 (Did you think that
Bob Dylan is the only source of literary inspiration?)54 Although the
Supreme Court has acknowledged that involuntarily confined mental
patients “possess[] a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted
administration of antipsychotic drugs,”55 many states do not require a
court hearing to determine the patient’s competence as a due process
protection to enforce that right. Those states use a medical decisionmaker
model, allowing a staff psychiatrist or hospital committee to make an
informal judgment of the patient’s competence.56 In essence, the patient’s
liberty interest—his or her legal interest—in avoiding the unwanted
administration of antipsychotic drugs is converted into a determination
of the patient’s medical interest as that interest is measured by the
patient’s physician or a hospital committee reviewing that physician’s
decision.57 Competent and zealous advocacy by patients’ attorneys in
51. In re Mental Health of K.G.F., 29 P.3d 485 (Mont. 2001).
52. Perlin, supra note 2, at 738, 741. In fact, only one case has even cited K.G.F.
in the three and one-half years since it was decided. In that case, the Court of Appeals of
Washington specifically rejected K.G.F.’s refusal to presume the effective assistance of
counsel in the civil commitment context, asserting: “We do not share the Montana
Supreme Court’s dim view of the quality of civil commitment proceedings, or their
adversarial nature, in the state of Washington.” In re T.A. H.-L., 97 P.3d 767, 771
(Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
53. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act III, sc. 2.
54. For those, like Michael, who demand a Dylan fix for every occasion, I offer
this alternative quotation: “She knows there’s no success like failure / And that failure’s
no success at all.” BOB DYLAN, Love Minus Zero/No Limit, on BRINGING IT ALL BACK
HOME (1965).
55. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990); see supra note 45.
56. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I §10-708 (2000) (using a medical
review panel); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-57(e) (2003) (using a second physician to review
the professional judgment of the treating physician); Catherine E. Blackburn, The
“Therapeutic Orgy” and the “Right to Rot” Collide: The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic
Drugs Under State Law, 27 HOUS. L. REV. 447, 479 & n.101, 493 & n.147 (1990) (citing
fourteen states that use a medical decisionmaker model and eighteen states that use a
judicial decisionmaker model to decide whether an involuntarily committed mental
patient’s treatment refusal will be upheld).
57. In Harper, 494 U.S. at 227, the Supreme Court held: “[T]he Due Process
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right to refuse treatment court hearings will not vindicate these patients’
right to refuse treatment because, in these states, there are no court
hearings to determine the patients’ competence to refuse treatment.
What about those states, including the nation’s five most populous
states (California,58 Texas,59 New York,60 Florida,61 and Illinois62), that
require a formal hearing on the patient’s competence before a judge or
other independent, law-trained decisionmaker? Surely, one could assert,
competent and zealous advocacy by patients’ attorneys will have a
significant impact on the results of those hearings. For example, for the
calendar years 2000 and 2001 combined, a total of 687 hearings were
conducted in Illinois to determine patient competence to refuse treatment.63
In only fifty-six of those hearings, did the patient prevail.64 Thus, under
Clause permits the State to treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with
antipsychotic drugs against his will, if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and
the treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest.” Further, the Harper Court ruled that
the prisoner was not entitled to a judicial hearing to determine whether he was competent
to refuse medication. Id. at 222, 226, 228. The Court upheld administrative hearing
procedures in which a hearing committee, composed of a psychiatrist, psychologist, and
the associate superintendent of the facility reviews the medical treatment decision. Id. at
215, 232–33. In Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 178–79 (2003), the Supreme Court,
relying on its Harper decision, upheld the involuntary administration of antipsychotic
medication on a criminal defendant who was incompetent to stand trial provided that the
treatment was medically appropriate, was substantially unlikely to have side effects that
could undermine the fairness of the trial, and was necessary to significantly further
important governmental, trial-related interests. Additionally, the Sell Court held that
conditions that limit forced medication to restore trial competence need not be
considered if forced medication is warranted for a different purpose—such as when the
defendant lacks the mental competence to make the treatment decision or when the
patient’s failure to accept medication poses a risk of injury to the patient or to others. Id.
at 181–82. Although Harper involved a sentence-serving, mentally ill prisoner and Sell
involved a criminal defendant who was incompetent to stand trial, the two cases suggest
that the Supreme Court is likely to uphold the constitutionality of a medical
decisionmaker model in right to refuse treatment situations involving civilly committed
patients.
58. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5332(b) (West Supp. 2005); see supra note 24.
59. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 574.103(b) (Vernon Supp. 2004–2005).
60. Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 343–44 (N.Y. 1986) (holding that when an
involuntarily committed mental patient refuses treatment with antipsychotic medication,
“there must be a judicial determination of whether the patient has the capacity to make a
reasoned decision with respect to proposed treatment before the drugs may be
administered” and declaring that “[s]uch a determination is uniquely a judicial, not a
medical function”).
61. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.459(3)(a) (West Supp. 2005).
62. 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-107.1 (West Supp. 2005).
63. See Wenona Y. Whitfield, Capacity, Competency, and Courts: The Illinois
Experience, 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 385, 403 n.68 (2004).
64. Id.
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current practice in Illinois, patients were successful in only 8.2% of right
to refuse treatment cases. If attorneys adequately prepared their cases
and argued them vigorously, they should be able to achieve a much
higher success rate for their clients. With competent and zealous
counsel, perhaps 100, or 150, or even 200 of those 687 patients would
have prevailed. But is this the appropriate measure of success?
During the two-year period in which 687 competency hearings were
conducted in Illinois, there were a total of 23,035 patients in the state’s
mental health centers.65 Thus 22,348 patients, that is, over ninety-seven
percent of the total, did not have competency hearings. These 22,348
patients did not have lawyers to assist them because they did not protest
their doctors’ orders. There were no competency hearings for these
patients because psychiatrists assume that patients who accept treatment
are competent to do so. Because the right to refuse treatment is not selfexecuting, these patients had no lawyers to demand that psychiatrists
meet their information disclosure obligation before patient consent to
treatment was obtained. Michael’s proposal for competent and zealous
attorney advocacy focuses narrowly on the 687 patients who refused
treatment, not more broadly on the 22,348 who accepted it.
And yet, does anyone really believe that all of these 22,348 patients
gave their voluntary, informed, and competent consent to treatment with
psychotropic medication? When psychiatrists are asked whether they
inform patients of the potential risks and benefits of, and alternatives to,
the proposed treatment, they typically answer in the affirmative.
However, in many right to refuse treatment hearings that I conducted in
California,66 psychiatrists testified that they informed patients only about
medication benefits.67 For example, in one case, the psychiatrist testified
that he told the patient “that haloperidol would help reduce her feelings of
anxiety and would reduce some or all of her hostility.”68 In another case,
the psychiatrist testified that he informed the patient that “she would feel
less agitated and that her thinking would improve if she agreed to
medications.”69 In another case, the psychiatrist simply stated: “I
informed the patient that medication would be necessary to help her with
her distress and encouraged her to take it.”70

65. Id.
66. See Grant H. Morris, Judging Judgment: Assessing the Competence of Mental
Patients to Refuse Treatment, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 343, 384–431 (1995) (reporting on
my experience as a mental health hearing officer in right to refuse treatment cases).
67. Id. at 426.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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Even when psychiatrists did discuss risks, they did not divulge “all
information relevant to a meaningful decisional process”71—the test of
disclosure imposed by the California Supreme Court. To obtain a
patient’s informed consent, that test requires the psychiatrist to divulge
all risks that are material to the patient’s decision.72 Sometimes
psychiatrists spoke about risks in general terms, informing patients that
any medication can have detrimental as well as beneficial effects.73 At
other times, psychiatrists discussed some side effects but not others.
Typically, the psychiatrist would inform the patient of non-neurological
side effects such as sedation or anticholinergic side effects such as dry
mouth, blurred vision, urinary retention, and constipation, but would
omit any discussion of neurological side effects such as dystonia,
Parkinsonism, akathisia, akinesia, and tardive dyskinesia.74 Obviously,
if the risk of non-neurological side effects is material to a patient’s
decision, the risk of neurological side effects is likely to be even more
so. When psychiatrists disclosed the risk of neurological side effects,
they usually sugar-coated the information. I deliberately chose the word
“sugar-coated.” In one hearing I conducted, in response to my question:
“Did you treat the patient with antipsychotic medication during this
admission?,” the psychiatrist testified: “No and yes. I managed to sweet
talk him into taking Navane a couple of times—three days in a row.”75
Sometimes psychiatrists testified that they used a written advisement
to inform patients about medication side effects. Typically, those socalled consent forms contained no information about risks but merely
asserted that the prescribing physician had provided information about
medication risks and benefits. Often those forms were used ritualistically
to substitute for the process of obtaining informed consent rather than as
71. Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1,10 (Cal. 1972).
72. The California Supreme Court summarized the physician’s disclosure duty as
follows:
In sum, the patient’s right of self-decision is the measure of the physician’s
duty to reveal. That right can be effectively exercised only if the patient
possesses adequate information to enable an intelligent choice. The scope of
the physician’s communications to the patient, then, must be measured by the
patient’s need, and that need is whatever information is material to the
decision. Thus the test for determining whether a potential peril must be
divulged is its materiality to the patient’s decision.
Id. at 11.
73. Morris, supra note 66, at 426.
74. Id. at 427.
75. Id. at 427 n.295.
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evidence that informed consent was, in fact, obtained.76
Based on the testimony I heard as a decisionmaker in right to refuse
treatment hearings, I would have to say that nondisclosure or, at best,
inadequate disclosure of risks was the norm; full disclosure was the rare
exception. This failure of full disclosure is not established, however—in
fact, it is not even an issue—if the patient does not refuse treatment
and no hearing is conducted. For most patients, no hearing is
conducted because most patients obediently accept—or are coerced into
accepting—medication that their psychiatrists prescribe. Don’t expect
your psychiatrist to come up here and fully discuss risks with you. He’s
far too busy doing other things. “Johnny’s in the basement mixing up
the medicine.”77
And even in those relatively few cases in which lawyers competently
and zealously represent patients who refuse treatment, what is the likely
result? What happens if the patient is found competent to refuse
treatment? Do you think that psychiatrists and hospital administrators
will allow that patient to remain at their hospital—taking up valuable
bed space while refusing treatment? No way. They will just release the
patient. But when his or her mental disorder kicks up again, and he or
she comes to the attention of the police, the hospital won’t accept this
person as a patient. Instead, he or she will be charged with some petty
crime—obstruction of the sidewalks or public places, loitering, aggressive
solicitation, or, if he or she is in Santa Barbara, leaning against a
building or a store.78 This mentally disabled person will be processed
through the criminal justice system.79 Think of it. The three largest
hospitals in the United States for the treatment of serious mental illness
are not hospitals at all. Rather, they are the three largest jails in the
country: Riker’s Island in New York City, the Cook County Jail in
Chicago, and the Los Angeles County Jail.80 And after this person has
76. Id. at 428.
77. BOB DYLAN, Subterranean Homesick Blues, on BRINGING IT ALL BACK HOME
(1965). Perhaps another Bob Dylan lyric is equally appropriate to characterize the
failure of psychiatrists to communicate to their patients the risks of medication they are
prescribing: “We never did too much talkin’ anyway.” BOB DYLAN, Don’t Think Twice,
It’s All Right, on THE FREEWHEELIN’ BOB DYLAN (1963).
78. The National Coalition for the Homeless reports these crimes as typical
offenses charged against homeless people. See As Homelessness Increases, Number of
Laws Targeting Homeless People Rise, at http://www.nationalhomeless.org/civilrights/
crim2003/index.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2005).
79. See generally Paul F. Stavis, Why Prisons Are Brim-Full of the Mentally Ill: Is
Their Incarceration a Solution or a Sign of Failure? 11 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J.
157 (2000); see also Abramson, supra note 8, at 103 (asserting that mentally disordered
individuals are often arrested and prosecuted for nuisance offenses as a convenient and
more reliable alternative to assure their involuntary detention than the LPS civil
commitment process).
80. Stavis, supra note 79, at 159.
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gone through this revolving door a number of times, when he or she is
arrested yet again, maybe he or she will be fortunate enough to be
diverted to a newly-created mental health court where the judge will
propose a deal that the person cannot refuse: If you agree to take your
medicine, you won’t go to jail for this latest offense.81
California has another option. Under LPS, if a person, as a result of
mental disorder, is believed to be a danger to others, or to himself or
herself, or gravely disabled, he or she may be detained for an initial
seventy-two-hour evaluation period.82 Thereafter, the person may be
certified for a fourteen-day intensive treatment period if any of these
three criteria is determined to exist.83 If the patient refuses treatment, a
hearing is conducted during this fourteen-day period to determine his or
her mental capacity to make that judgment.84 Nevertheless, even if the
patient is found to have the mental capacity to refuse treatment, the
hospital can immediately initiate conservatorship proceedings, claiming
that the patient is gravely disabled.85 And once the person is placed on a
conservatorship—or even a temporary conservatorship before the full
hearing is conducted86—the conservator can consent to the administration
of medication over the patient’s objection.87
How popular is this option? In the most current report available,88 the
California Department of Mental Health discloses that in the 2000–2001
81. See Michael L. Perlin, “On Desolation Row”: The Blurring of the Borders
Between Civil and Criminal Mental Disability Law, and What It Means to All of Us 29
(Apr. 14, 2005) (unpublished article based on a keynote address presented at the annual
meeting of the American Association of Psychiatry and the Law, Newport Beach, CA,
Oct. 2002) (manuscript available from Michael Perlin) (noting that mental health courts
“identify mentally ill, non-violent offenders and order or sentence them to receive mental
health services in lieu of confinement in a jail or prison”); Debra Baker, Special
Treatment: A One-of-a-Kind Court May Offer the Best Hope for Steering Nonviolent
Mentally Ill Defendants into Care Instead of Jail, 84 A.B.A. J. 20 (June 1998)
(describing the first such mental health court, established in Broward County, Florida).
82. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150 (West 1998).
83. Id. § 5250.
84. Id. § 5332(b) (West Supp. 2005).
85. Id. § 5352 (West 1998).
86. Id. § 5352.1 (authorizing the court to issue an ex parte order establishing a
temporary conservatorship pending the determination of the petition for a conservatorship).
The powers granted to a temporary conservator may be as broad as the powers granted to
a conservator. Id. § 5353.
87. Id. § 5358(a)(2), (b); see supra text accompanying notes 20–25.
88. STATISTICS & DATA ANALYSIS, CAL. DEP’T OF MENTAL HEALTH, Involuntary
Detention Data—Fiscal Year 2000-01(July 1, 2000–June 30, 2001), at http://www.
dmh.cahwnet.gov/SADA/docs/Involuntary-Detention-Data/Rep0001_FINAL.pdf (last visited
Apr. 11, 2005).
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fiscal year, 125,895 adults were detained on seventy-two-hour evaluation
holds as dangerous to self, dangerous to others, or gravely disabled. Of
that number, 51,268 were then detained on fourteen-day intensive
treatment certifications. How many of those people were subsequently
detained for a 180-day period as demonstrably dangerous to others?
You will be delighted to learn that only sixty met that standard. Think
of it: For a whole year, after only seventeen days or less of inpatient
hospitalization, there were only sixty dangerously mentally ill people in
the entire state of California. But many of those who were initially
detained as dangerous to others were suddenly found to be gravely
disabled and processed through the LPS conservatorship route. For
fiscal year 2000–2001, a total of 7198 conservatorships were established.
When the legal standard and procedural safeguards for lengthy civil
commitment and coerced treatment is perceived as too protective of the
mentally disabled—too difficult for us to achieve—we simply bypass
them and substitute an alternative, but far easier route to reach the
desired result.
Our sanist society will continue to find ways to require the mentally
disabled to act as obedient children and take their medicine.89 Even if
lawyers do advocate vigorously for their clients in individual right to
refuse treatment cases, little will change. The goal, the objective, the
prize, as Michael knows so well, is not the vindication of the right to
refuse psychotropic medication for the few mentally disabled clients
who are courageous enough to raise that issue and whose lawyers
advocate vigorously for them. The goal, the objective, the real prize is
acceptance of mentally disabled individuals as people, with the same
rights that other people have—the end of discrimination against the
mentally disabled; the end of sanism. Sadly, zealous lawyer advocacy in
89. Involuntary outpatient commitment, euphemistically called “assisted outpatient
treatment,” is another example demonstrating that society’s preferred, and perhaps its
“final solution” to the problem of the mentally disabled, is coerced treatment with
psychotropic medication. Under recently enacted statutes patterned after New York’s
Kendra’s Law, a mentally disabled person can be required to take psychotropic
medication while living in the community, and if the person does not comply, he or she
may be involuntarily hospitalized. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(n)
(McKinney 2002). Critics contend that these laws, by coercing noncivilly committed
persons to accept treatment under the threat of institutionalization, erode fundamental
human rights and the process by which these rights are protected in the courts. See, e.g.,
Erin O’Connor, Note, Is Kendra’s Law a Keeper? How Kendra’s Law Erodes Fundamental
Rights of the Mentally Ill, 11 J.L. & POL’Y 313, 342–49 (2002); Kristina M. Campbell,
Note, Blurring the Lines of the Danger Zone: The Impact of Kendra’s Law on the Rights
of the Nonviolent Mentally Ill, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 173, 185–87,
192–98 (2002); Michael L. Perlin, supra note 81, at 13–17. Critics of statutes
establishing involuntary outpatient commitment might well agree with Bob Dylan’s
assessment of the legislative process: “Fools making laws for the breaking of jaws / And
the sound of the keys as they clink / But there’s no time to think.” BOB DYLAN, No Time
to Think, on STREET LEGAL (1978).
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individual right to refuse treatment cases will move us only marginally
toward that goal.
IV. CONCLUSION
The failure of lawyers, judges, psychiatrists, and society to treat
mentally disabled people as people, that is, to treat them with dignity and
respect, has left me dejected, depressed, even despondent. As Bob
Dylan wrote, in a line that Michael quoted in his article, “I don’t have
the strength / To get up and take another shot.”90
But not so for Michael Perlin. He remains defiant, determined, and
most of all, devoted. Just like Don Quixote de la Mancha, this gallant
knight remains dedicated to his cause.91 He continues to speak, and to
write, and to hope.92 He pursues justice for the mentally disabled.93
Although we do not hear him and do not heed him, he will continue his
quest. The windmills that Michael contests are not mere figments of his
imagination. They are real and continuing problems. Michael is an
irresistible force. But our attitude—our prejudice—toward the mentally
disabled may well be an immovable object. How long will Michael
continue to speak in a forest, while we hear only “sounds of silence”?94
90. BOB DYLAN, Just Like Tom Thumb’s Blues, on HIGHWAY 61 REVISITED (1965).
91. In tribute to Michael Perlin:
May you grow up to be righteous,
May you grow up to be true,
May you always know the truth
And see the lights surrounding you.
May you always be courageous,
Stand upright and be strong,
May you stay forever young.
BOB DYLAN, Forever Young, on PLANET WAVES (1974).
92. Miguel de Cervantes: “When life itself seems lunatic, who knows where
madness lies? . . . Too much sanity may be madness. And maddest of all, to see life as
it is and not as it should be.” DALE WASSERMAN, MAN OF LA MANCHA 61 (1966).
93. I saw a man pursuing the horizon;
Round and round they sped.
I was disturbed at this;
I accosted the man.
“It is futile,” I said,
“You can never—”
“You lie,” he cried,
And ran on.
STEPHEN CRANE, POEMS OF STEPHEN CRANE 15 (Gerald D. McDonald ed., 1964).
94. PAUL SIMON & ART GARFUNKEL, The Sound of Silence, on THE SOUNDS OF
SILENCE (1964) (lyrics by Paul Simon).
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Or as Bob Dylan inquired: “[H]ow many ears must one man have /
Before he can hear people cry?”95

95. BOB DYLAN, Blowin’ in the Wind, on THE FREEWHEELIN’ BOB DYLAN (1963).
Or as Bob Dylan phrased it twenty-seven years later, “She ain’t hearing a thing, the
silence is a-stickin’ her deep.” BOB DYLAN, Cat’s in the Well, on UNDER THE RED SKY
(1990).
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